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MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/MAY 1999
This paper focuses on the recently developing financial derivatives
markets, and examines the usefulness of option prices as an informa-
tion variable for monetary policy implementation. A set of option
prices provides us with information on the entire probability distrib-
ution of the future values of underlying assets. Such information
enables us to examine the development of market expectations. The
paper estimates a time series of implied probability distributions
from daily option prices on stock price index and long-term govern-
ment bond futures in Japan. The estimation is done for a sample of
daily closing prices for the following three periods: (1) the period of a 
collapsing “bubble” in the stock market in 1989–90; (2) the period
of serious stock market slump in 1992–94; and (3) the period of
increasing anxiety in the market about a possible deflationary 
spiral in 1995.
Key  words:  Option prices; Implied probability distribution;
Market expectations; Monetary policy; Information
variablesI. Introduction
In this paper, we focus on the recently developing financial derivatives markets in
Japan and examine the usefulness of option trading prices as an information variable
for monetary policy implementation. By estimating the entire probability distribu-
tion of future asset prices from a set of option prices and tracking the changes in that
distribution over time, we examine the development of market expectations and how
monetary policy has affected that development.
In general, asset prices reflect market participants’ expectations about the future.
During the “bubble” era, Japan experienced large fluctuations both in asset prices and
in the real economy, and market expectations seem to have played an important role
behind the scenes. For example, market expectations became bullish during the emer-
gence and expansion of the asset price bubble and remained almost unchanged even
when interest rates were revised upward. In such circumstances, a substantial rise in
interest rates is required in order to change market expectations. To put it differently,
the effects of tight monetary policy, even accompanied by quite high interest rates, do
not appear significant until market expectations change. Once such expectations have
been revised, downward pressure on asset prices becomes extremely large because the
revision of expectations intensifies the original effects of higher interest rates through
the expansion of risk premiums. 
We examine how market expectations concerning underlying asset prices are
formed and how they change, using daily price data on the option markets in Japan.
Specifically, we estimate the entire implied probability distribution of future values of
underlying assets from a set of option prices with the same time-to-maturity, but
with different exercise prices. This method enables us to obtain information about
the dispersion of market expectations concerning asset price fluctuations, as well as
about market participants’ beliefs about the direction of market price changes and the
probability of an extreme outcome in the market. 
We study the practical usefulness of this methodology through case studies involv-
ing Japanese option markets. Given the data constraints, three periods have been
selected: (1) the period of the collapsing “bubble”
1 from the second half of 1989 to
1990; (2) the period of serious stock market slump from 1992 to early 1994; and 
(3) the period of increasing anxiety in the market about the deflationary spiral in
1995. In each period, we consider on a time-series basis (1) how market expectations
of stock prices and long-term interest rates changed; (2) how and when the relation-
ships between such market expectations and economic indicators changed; and 
(3) how monetary policy implementation affected such market expectations.
This paper is composed as follows. In Chapter II, we present the basic framework
for examining the development of market expectations. We discuss the estimation
methodology of implied probability distributions, based on the limitation in readily
available data in Japanese option markets. In addition, we conceptually study how we
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1. It is interesting to examine how market expectations changed during the initial period of the “bubble” era.
However, due to the fact that Nikkei 225 option trading started in June 1989 and Japanese government bond
(JGB) futures option trading started in May 1990, this paper must limit its scope of analysis to the period after the
“bubble” burst.can interpret the changes in market expectations from the movements of summary
statistics of the estimated implied probability distributions over time. In Chapter III,
we conduct case studies for various episodes in Japanese financial markets from 1989
to 1995 to examine the practical usefulness of our methodology for extracting market
expectations. We estimate the summary statistics of the implied probability distribu-
tion on a daily basis, and examine the changes in market expectations captured in
estimation results, with reference to monetary policy implementation. In Chapter IV,
we provide a conclusion with some policy implications. In the appendices, we show
the specific calculation methods used for the implied probability distributions, as well
as the basic framework of financial option trading in Japan.
II. Basic Framework for Analyzing Changes in Market
Expectations
Since the 1970s, methods of extracting market expectations concerning future 
asset prices by using derivatives trading prices have been developed and are im-
proving.
2 In this chapter, we first summarize various methodologies for extracting 
market expectations from data for financial markets. We also point out some data
problems in conducting empirical analysis in the Japanese option markets. Then, we
discuss which method is appropriate for application to Japanese option markets.
Finally, we examine the interpretation of the estimates and the bias inherent in a 
discrete approximation. 
A. Method for Extracting Market Expectations 
We summarize the methodology used to extract market expectations from option
prices based on past studies.
1. The method used for extracting market expectations
There are three methods used to analyze market expectations concerning future asset
prices based on financial market data.
The first method is to estimate the implied forward rates from swap rates or 
government bond yields, and observe expected interest rates by maturity. The second
method is, by using option price information, to observe the implied volatility estimated
by the Black-Scholes Model (Black and Scholes [1973]), and to evaluate the dispersion
of expectations concerning future asset prices. The third method also uses option
price information, although it goes as far as deriving the entire risk-neutral implied 
probability distribution of future prices of the underlying assets.
By estimating the entire expectation distribution, the third method enables us to
examine market expectations concerning future outcomes in detail. In other words, we
can obtain information about the dispersion of market expectations concerning asset price
fluctuations, as well as about market participants’ beliefs about the direction of market
price changes and the probability of an extreme outcome in the market. This method is
3
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2. A comprehensive survey of these methods can be found in Neuhaus (1995), Söderlind and Svensson (1997),
Bahra (1996, 1997), and Oda and Yoshiba (1998).deemed useful for close monitoring of the impact of monetary policy on market
expectations. In the following, we will discuss rather extensively the specifics of how to
estimate the implied probability distribution. 
2. Estimation methods for the implied probability distribution
The methods used to estimate the implied probability distribution fall into two 
categories according to whether or not they ex ante assume a specific distribution
function.
Models that ex ante assume a specific distribution function include a model which
assumes underlying asset prices follow a jump probability distribution process
3 (Malz
[1996]; Bates [1991, 1996, 1997]), and a model which assumes a probability density
function of underlying asset prices that follows a mixture of some lognormal distribu-
tion (Melick and Thomas [1997]; Bahra [1996]; Söderlind and Svensson [1997];
Söderlind [1998]). There are various other possible models that assume different
probability distribution patterns. However, in the actual analysis, it is impossible to
recognize ex ante the probability distribution of the underlying asset prices, and thus
these models inherit the deficiency of not being able to preclude arbitrariness from
the estimation process.
Other less-constrained models, in which a specific distribution pattern is not
assumed ex ante, include a method of directly estimating the probability distribution
of option price data by using finite difference methods
4 (Breeden and Litzenberger
[1978]; Neuhaus [1995]), a method that utilizes a smoothing curve called the spline
function (Oda and Yoshiba [1998]), and a method that applies kernel regression 
(Aït-Sahalia and Lo [1998]).
B. Application to Japanese Markets
Next, based on the features of Japanese option markets, we examine which estimation
method to apply in our study. We use the Nikkei 225 option (a European-type
option) and the Japanese government bond (JGB) futures option (an American-type
option).
5 The underlying assets of those options are the Nikkei 225 Stock Average
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3. It is not necessarily logical to assume that asset prices such as stock prices change continuously, since social and
economic information emerges intermittently. In finance theory, a jump probability distribution process is often
used to cope with discontinuous price changes. In detail, there are two types in a jump distribution process: a pure
jump probability distribution process and a diffusion probability distribution process. A pure jump probability
distribution process assumes that price changes follow a discrete Poisson process. A diffusion probability distribu-
tion process assumes that price changes follow a weighted average of the Wiener process (continual price changes)
and the Poisson process (intermittent price changes). 
4. Finite difference methods convert differential equations into a set of difference equations and the difference 
equations are solved iteratively, and are widely used to solve the partial differential that represents the derivatives
price. To illustrate the approach, we consider a first-order differentiable continuous function f (S). A number of
equally spaced stock prices are chosen as S1, S2, . . . , Sk, . . . , and the width of the space as DS. The first-order 
differential ¶f /¶Sï S=Sk at point Sk can be approximated as a forward difference approximation {f (Sk+1) – f (Sk)}/DS, 
a backward difference approximation {f (Sk) – f (Sk–1)}/DS, and a central difference approximation {f (Sk+1) – f (Sk–1)}/
2DS. Among these, this paper adopts the central difference approximation, which is the one with a more symmetrical
approximation. For details on the finite difference methods, see Chapter 15 of Hull (1997).
5. We apply the calculation method for the European-type option explained in Appendix 1 to the JGB futures
option that is the American-type option. In general, calculation of the American-type option is more complicated
than that of the European one, since buyers can arbitrarily exercise the option. However, Chen and Scott (1993)
showed that the American-type interest rate futures option can be priced as the European-type option if sellers
submit margins and the margins are marked to market every day. Since the JGB futures option applies a similar
margin system, we believe that there should be no problem in treating it as the European-type option.(hereafter, Nikkei 225) and the 10-year JGB futures, respectively (see Appendix 2 for
the outline of each transaction).
6
1. Limitations of available data for Japanese option markets
Some cautions are in order concerning the empirical analysis of Japanese option data.
First, only a small number of opened strike prices are available. Since there is very
small trading volume for the in-the-money (ITM) strike prices, reliability of price
information is not entirely satisfactory. 
Second, there is a limitation involved in using closing price data. Namely, using
closing price data will not guarantee that the option premiums of different strike
prices were traded at the same time. If there are substantial time differences in the
traded times of closing prices across different strike prices, arbitrage may not function
thoroughly. In this case, the probability density of the implied probability distribution
will inherit certain biases.
Third, it has been pointed out that, during the transitional period of most actively
traded contract months, trading prices will not fully reflect market expectations 
concerning future outcomes. As a result, the most actively traded contract month
might not be the contract month with the largest trading volume.
2. Strategy to deal with the data problems
One possible strategy for overcoming the problems mentioned above is to impose
some restrictions to guarantee that the results give a reasonable probability distribu-
tion, such as assuming a mixture of some lognormal, and a fitted spline function.
Another strategy is to apply a simple discrete approximation method to carefully
sorted data. We have used the latter strategy to estimate a time series of implied 
probability distributions with the following devised data treatment.
7
First, we have applied a simple discrete approximation method. It is difficult to
get a robust estimation result when we apply a complicated methodology to a small
sample. Considering the lesser observations across the different strike prices in the
Japanese option markets, advanced methodology is not necessarily required. In 
addition, a simple methodology may even give rise to clearer policy implications.
Second, we have used price data regarding both put and call options that are 
at-the-money (ATM) and out-of-the-money (OTM). We first calculate two pro-
bability distributions from the option premium for call and put options separately,
then combine two probability distributions at the ATM strike price to form the 
complete probability distribution (see Figure 1 for the illustration of the estimation
procedure). In this sense, our methodology has the merit of effectively utilizing 
trading price information by making the ATM strike price the boundary and using
both put and call options on the OTM side. Therefore, there is an advantage in 
estimating the implied probability distribution using limited quotations of option
premiums across different strike prices, such as Japanese option markets.
5
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6. A Euroyen interest rate futures option has also been traded in Japan since July 1991, although due to the short 
overlapping period for the purpose of our analysis and the rather low trading volume, we judged that the credibility
of price data on the Euroyen interest rate futures option markets is questionable and thus excluded it from our study.
7. Of course, it should be noted that a bias might be introduced, even though we apply a simple method to carefully
sorted data, especially when the expiration date of the option approaches and the number of traded strike prices in
the markets becomes smaller. Further research is required on the robustness of estimation results across the different
methods for estimating implied probability distributions.6 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/MAY 1999
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Third, we have excluded mispriced observations, such as those which result in a
negative probability density, in estimating the complete probability distribution. As
previously mentioned, using closing price data does not guarantee that the option
premiums of different strike prices were traded at the same time, and arbitrage may
not function thoroughly. 
Fourth, we have excluded from our analysis as much as possible the data of the
final week of each contract month. As a result, the most actively traded contract
month might not be the contract month with the largest trading volume.
C. Framework for Interpretation of Changes in Market Expectations
In this paper, we examine the changes in market expectations by using a time series of
four summary statistics or moments (mean, standard deviation, skewness, and excess 
kurtosis) of the estimated implied probability distributions. Then, after defining the four
Figure 1  Estimation Method for Implied Probability Distributionssummary statistics, we discuss how we can interpret changes in market expectations from
changes in these statistics. In addition, we discuss the possibility of biases induced by the
discrete approximation method, which we employ in this paper.
1. Summary statistics and shape of distribution
We employ a time series of summary statistics of estimated implied probability distri-
butions to investigate the changes in market expectations. Specifically, we obtain
mean, standard deviation (Stdv), skewness (Skew), and excess kurtosis (Ex-Kurt)
from the histogram of implied probability distribution. 
Since stock and bond prices are both positive values, even when market expecta-
tions belong to the same population corresponding to the same probability space, the
expectation distribution of future assets will follow a lognormal distribution. In other
words, the distribution is expected to be skewed to the right. However, it is not 
convenient to use a lognormal distribution as a benchmark for evaluating the size of
the above summary statistics. Therefore, we calculate these summary statistics by
using the strike price converted into a logarithm, and employ a normal distribution
as the benchmark for evaluating the four summary statistics. As shown in Appendix
1, if we use p(Ki) obtained by the formulations (A.14) and (A.15), the four summary
statistics can be shown as follows:
ln(Ki) + ln(Ki+1) Mean    = å p(Ki) (1)
2
ln(Ki) + ln(Ki+1)      
2
Stdv      = √ å( – Mean)p(Ki) (2)
2
ln(Ki) + ln(Ki+1)      
3




ln(Ki) + ln(Ki+1)      
4
Ex-Kurt = å( – Mean)p(Ki)/
Stdv
4 – 3. (4)
2
While the mean of the estimated risk-neutral implied probability shifts in parallel
with the size of risk premium compared with the true probability distribution, the
risk premium itself is difficult to estimate.
8 Thus, in the following, we focus on
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8. The model used in this paper assumes a risk-neutral world, while market participants in the actual market are not
necessarily risk-neutral. In addition, it is likely that the risk preferences of market participants change over time. 
In that case, the (risk-neutral) implied probability distribution, estimated under the assumption of risk-neutral 
valuation, will differ from the true probability distribution. However, Cox and Ross (1976) claimed that, com-
pared with the true probability distribution, the risk-neutral implied probability distribution shifts in parallel with
the size of the risk premium, and thus will not affect moments higher than the second.
9. As Bates (1991) and others have pointed out, it is generally known that the standard deviation decreases as 
the maturity date of the contract is approached. Therefore, we try to control the impact of changes in time-to-
maturity on the estimated time series of the standard deviation by multiplying the square root of (360/time-
to-maturity) to obtain the annual rate.The changes in market expectations captured by the movements of each summary
statistic can be summarized as follows. From the standard deviation, we can see the
dispersion of distributions, that is, how wide the market expectations are, which 
cannot be distinguished by only observing the mean.
Skewness is a statistic that shows the extent of asymmetry of the distribution: it is
zero in the case of a symmetric distribution such as the normal distribution, positive
when distribution is skewed to the right, and negative when skewed to the left
(Figure 2). 
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Figure 3  Excess Kurtosis
Excess kurtosis is a statistic that shows the degree of sharpness of a probability
density near its center and the likelihood of extreme outcomes: it is also zero in the
case of a normal distribution. When positive, probability density at the center of 
distribution is high, and thus the shape of the distribution becomes sharp at the 
center and also fat-tailed. When negative, the distribution becomes flat at the center
and light-tailed (Figure 3). It might be worth explaining in detail what kind of information about changes in
market expectations can be captured by the shift in the excess kurtosis. As the excess 
kurtosis increases, (1) the extent of sharpness at the center will increase; and (2) the degree
of fatness at the tail will increase. If we compare such changes intuitively with an 
economic agent’s expectation formation process, two interpretations are possible: (1) an
agent is expecting that asset prices are not likely to change from the center of distribu-
tion; or (2) an agent is expecting that asset prices are likely to change substantially, namely,
to take outlier values. Therefore, it is not clear whether we can draw any implications for
economic agents’ expectations by just observing the changes in the excess kurtosis. 
In order to decide which of the above two interpretations we should take, we need
to combine excess kurtosis with standard deviation, a measure that represents the 
dispersion of the whole distribution. Specifically, when there is no change or decrease
in the standard deviation, an increase in the excess kurtosis will sharpen the probabil-
ity density near its center, and can be interpreted as an increase in economic agents’ 
confidence in the current market level. On the contrary, when there is an increase in
the standard deviation, a rise in the excess kurtosis will make the tails of distribution
fatter, and can be regarded as indicating a higher possibility of extreme outcomes.
Such interpretations are summarized in Table 1. 
9
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Table 1  Interpretation of Fluctuation in Standard Deviation and Excess Kurtosis
Excess kurtosis
Rise Fall
Larger risks on price changes Larger risks on price changes
Rise ++
stronger expectation of weaker confidence concerning
Standard an extreme outcome the current price level
deviation Smaller risks on price changes Smaller risks on price changes
Fall ++
stronger confidence concerning weaker expectation of
the current price level an extreme outcome











Figure 4  Changes in Distribution of Market Expectations during the Rise in Market Level
2. Interpretation of changes in summary statistics
When the market level fluctuates, how do the above summary statistics react, and
through them, what kinds of changes in market participants’ expectations can be
grasped? Figure 4 shows an image of typical changes in probability distribution when the market level is rising. As shown in the left part of the figure, the standard deviation and
the excess kurtosis rise and the skewness shifts in a negative direction. Subsequently, after
a short time and with gradually recovering stability in the market, both the standard 
deviation and the excess kurtosis decline, the extent of negative shift of the skewness
shrinks, and the distribution will approach a normal distribution.
10
We interpret the changes in implied probability distribution as capturing the
changes in the expectations of a representative investor in the market.
11 Namely, a
representative investor’s expectation of stock price fluctuations will follow a normal 
distribution in the long run, although it will exhibit stronger confidence in either a rise
or a fall in the short run reflecting factors such as the current phase of the business cycle.
For example, in the early phase of a market rise, the representative investor will expect a
further improvement in companies’ performances and thus expect the market to rise for
the time being, resulting in a swelling of the right side of the expectation distribution.
Consequently, the distribution will be skewed to the left, and the skewness becomes nega-
tive. In addition, since the risk of price fluctuations increases, the standard deviation
increases, the fatness of the left tail increases relatively, and the excess kurtosis rises.
In summary, for short-term changes in the market, skewness will change in the
direction opposite to that of the market level, while the standard deviation and the
excess kurtosis increase. The changes of these three summary statistics show how
market expectations have responded to external shocks, and thus tell us the magni-
tude of any unexpected shocks that hit the market. In addition, by examining the
length of the adjustment period needed to regain the original position, we can see to
what extent market expectations have been smoothly adjusted. 
3. Biases from discrete approximation
We have so far discussed how to interpret each summary statistic by assuming a 
continuous probability distribution. However, the actual analytical method, which
we employ in this paper discretely, approximates a continuous distribution based on an
idea called the finite difference method with discretely observed option prices. Thus, there
is a possibility that discrete approximation may introduce errors into each summary sta-
tistic. We simulate the errors of the discrete approximation against the continuous
standardized normal distribution, when the center of the distribution is shifted.
12
Figure 5 is an illustration that shows the extent of errors introduced when the
center of the distribution is shifted by 0.4 times one standard deviation from the
original center located in the center of the interval in the histogram. The normal 
distribution shifts from the dark to the light solid line, and the discrete approxima-
tions of the distribution before and after the shift are shown as histograms of the dark
solid line and of the shadowed area, respectively.
13
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10. When the market level is falling, the skewness will shift in a positive direction, while the standard deviation and
the excess kurtosis generally change as they do in the case of a market rise. In the following, therefore, we can
equally discuss the case of a market fall by changing the sign of skewness.
11. In interpreting the changes in implied probability distribution from the viewpoint of economic theory, we owe
much to our discussion with Takeo Hoshi. 
12. We owe much to our discussions with Genshiro Kitagawa, Yuichi Nagahara, and Seisho Sato in dealing with errors
in discrete approximation.
13. Since the actual fluctuation of asset prices is, in general, asymmetric and fat-tailed, we often focus on excess kurtosis
that shows the fatness of the tails in distribution. However, taking account of the fact that errors of discrete approximation
are largest in excess kurtosis in our analytical framework, this summary statistic requires wide interpretation.In this case, although the original probability distribution is a symmetric normal
distribution, the discretely approximated distribution is skewed to the left because
the center of the original distribution has shifted to the right from the center of the
interval in the histogram. When we see the errors in each summary statistic shown in
the box in Figure 5, errors of the mean and the standard deviation are small and do
not increase that much as the center of the distribution shifts. In contrast, errors in
the skewness and excess kurtosis will increase slightly as the center shifts.
Our next simulation, shown in Figure 6, examines to what extent the approxi-
mated error changes according to the shift in the center of distribution.
14 Errors in
mean are almost negligible: in the standard deviation they are about 0.04 points,
11
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14. This simulation continues to assume the intervals of the discrete approximation as one standard deviation, and
depicts how each summary statistic disperses from that of a standard normal distribution when the center of the
distribution moves by an interval of 0.01 times one standard deviation.












Discrete (time = 0)
Discrete (time = 1)
0.4 times of standard deviation
Distance from the center measured by standard deviation
Continuous (time = 0)
Continuous (time = 1)
Mean:      0.00 ®   0.40
               (0.00 ®   0.40)
Stdv:        1.04 ®   1.04
               (1.00 ®   1.00)
Skew:      0.00 ® –0.02
               (0.00 ®   0.00)
Ex-Kurt: –0.06 ® –0.09
               (0.00 ®   0.00)
Figure 5  Bias in Discrete Approximation
Notes: 1. This chart shows errors in the discrete approximation of standard normal distribution,
when the center of the distribution is shifted from the center by 0.4 times one standard
deviation.
2. Figures in the box show the impact of shift in the center of distribution on summary
statistics. Figures in parentheses indicate summary statistics in original standard normal
distributions.
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Figure 6  Simulation of the Impact of Discrete Approximation
Note: This chart shows dispersion of various summary statistics of the discrete approximation by the interval of one
standard deviation from those of standard normal deviation, as the center of the distribution moves.although they are stable and do not increase as the original distribution shifts away
from the center; errors in skewness increase as the original distribution shifts away
from the center, although the size is only 0.04 points at the largest. In the meantime,
errors in excess kurtosis increase from 0.06 to 0.10 points, and when the original 
distribution shifts from the center more than 0.25 times one standard deviation, the
error starts to increase by a larger amount. 
So what are the effects of such discrete approximation errors on the actual estima-
tion? In the actual option transaction, intervals of strike prices are set constant
regardless of the price level of the underlying assets or time-to-maturity. Therefore,
effects of the above errors based on the standard deviation will change as stock prices
and times-to-maturity change. 
In order to see this, we have estimated a matrix (Table 2) showing what size of stock
price volatility (i.e., the annualized standard deviation) corresponds to half of the
strike price interval (¥250) under different combinations of stock price (rows) and time-
to-maturity (columns). When the stock price level is more than ¥28,000, and as long as
the time-to-maturity of the option is more than five days, stock price volatility will not
exceed 0.25 times one standard deviation,
15 the level at which effects of errors in discrete
approximation start to increase. However, when the stock price falls to the level of
¥24,000, stock price volatility exceeds 0.25 times one standard deviation even with a time-
to-maturity of more than 20 days, and thus the effects of errors may become substantial.
16
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Table 2  Impact of Changes in Stock Price Level and Time-to-Maturity to
Approximation Errors
Stock price Time-to-maturity (days)
(yen) 5 1 01 52 02 53 03 54 04 5
14,000 15.2 10.7 8.7 7.6 6.8 6.2 5.7 5.4 5.1
16,000 13.3 9.4 7.7 6.6 5.9 5.4 5.0 4.7 4.4
18,000 11.8 8.3 6.8 5.9 5.3 4.8 4.5 4.2 3.9
20,000 10.6 7.5 6.1 5.3 4.7 4.3 4.0 3.8 3.5
22,000 9.6 6.8 5.6 4.8 4.3 3.9 3.6 3.4 3.2
24,000 8.8 6.3 5.1 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.3 3.1 2.9
26,000 8.2 5.8 4.7 4.1 3.6 3.3 3.1 2.9 2.7
28,000 7.6 5.4 4.4 3.8 3.4 3.1 2.9 2.7 2.5
30,000 7.1 5.0 4.1 3.5 3.2 2.9 2.7 2.5 2.4
32,000 6.6 4.7 3.8 3.3 3.0 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.2
34,000 6.2 4.4 3.6 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.4 2.2 2.1
36,000 5.9 4.2 3.4 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.1 2.0
38,000 5.6 3.9 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.1 2.0 1.9
40,000 5.3 3.8 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.8
Notes: 1. Figures in this table indicate how large volatility (i.e., annualized standard deviation) of stock prices corre-
sponds to half of the interval between adjacent exercise prices, that is, ¥250.
2. Shaded figures are those that exceed the mean daily volatility (annualized) of stock prices (from 1989 to
1996) multiplied by 0.25 (22.3 ´ 0.25 = 5.566).
15. In calculating the standard deviation, which serves as the evaluation criterion, we used daily volatility (annual-
ized) of the Nikkei 225 during 1989–96.
16. In 1989, when Nikkei 225 option trading started, the Nikkei 225 was over ¥30,000, and thus might not have
introduced any large errors even with ¥500 strike price intervals. However, because of the subsequent fall in stock
prices, intervals of strike prices have become relatively wide. The estimate in this paper can be interpreted to
imply the necessity of reviewing the strike price intervals.An often-used approach to analyze changes in market participants’ expectations 
is to compare the distribution shapes themselves before and after certain events,
because these are easy to understand. However, based on the above simulation, it
should be noted that there is a risk of misreading the discrete approximation 
errors as precise indicators of changes in market expectations, since this approach
depends on option prices at a specific point in time. In addition, as previously 
mentioned, option trading in the Japanese markets features only a few strike prices
and the market is still not deep enough.
17 Therefore, if we interpret the changes in
implied probability distribution by relying on the distribution shapes at a specific
point in time, changes explained in this way are subject to disturbing factors such as
temporary mispricing. 
Based on the above discussion, this paper tracks a time series of summary statistics (the
standard deviation, skewness, and excess kurtosis) of implied probability distributions to
examine the changes in financial market participants’ expectations.
18 In addition, taking
into account the fact that the intervals of the strike prices are relatively large and thus
likely to introduce errors by discrete approximation, we observe the general trend of
changes in each summary statistic which is shown by the distribution shape, and
focus on examining the relationship between asset price movements and changes in 
distribution shape.
III. Development of Financial Markets and Market Expectations
We will now apply the method of analysis introduced in the previous chapter to 
periods in which financial markets have experienced large fluctuations, and examine
how market participants’ expectations have changed in the course of those events.
Specifically, we will consider three periods: (1) the second half of 1989 to 1990, the
period of the collapse of the “bubble” in the stock market; (2) 1992 to the beginning
of 1994, the period of record-low stock prices; and (3) 1995, the period of increasing
anxiety in the market about a possible deflationary spiral.
A. Overview
Instead of proceeding directly with a case study of each period, we first summarize
the development of financial markets—short- and long-term interest rates, foreign
exchange rates, and stock prices—as well as the condition of the Japanese economy 
and the responses of monetary policy. We also try to draw a rough image of how 
the implied probability distribution extracted from the Nikkei 225 options has
changed over time. 
13
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17. While normally there are about five traded strike prices in the Nikkei 225 options, the S&P 500 stock price
index options have some 30 prices.
18. There are various ways of examining the time-series changes in estimated implied probability distribution. For
example, Söderlind (1998) tried to evaluate the market expectations for British monetary policy during the
European currency crisis in 1992, and instead of analyzing several statistics that show the distribution shape, used
a 90 percent confidence interval around a risk-neutral expected value.1. Development of financial markets and monetary policy
Based on Figure 7, we first review the development of financial markets and 
monetary policy from the second half of 1989 to 1995.
In the period of the collapsing “bubble,” the Bank of Japan initiated a preemptive
tightening of monetary policy on May 31, 1989, followed by a second tightening in
mid-October and a third on December 25, four days before the Nikkei 225 reached
its peak. Even after the stock price peaked, this tight policy stance was maintained
until mid-1991, when the discount rate was lowered from 6.0 percent to 5.5 percent
on July 1 to end the two-year tightening period. In the meantime, the uncollateral-
ized overnight call rate moved roughly in parallel with the discount rate, while the
10-year government bond yield sometimes moved in the opposite direction to that of
14 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/MAY 1999
Source: Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Monthly.
Figure 7  Development of Financial and Foreign Exchange Markets
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Yen Yen/US$the call rate. With regard to the stock prices, after reaching its peak at ¥38,915 
in December 1989, the Nikkei 225 tumbled during the period from February 
to May 1990. After a temporary rebound, it fell again from the latter half of 
1990 to a level below ¥20,000. Subsequently, the Nikkei 225 rallied to ¥26,000, 
although it dropped to some ¥22,000 in the second half of 1991. The Economic
Planning Agency reported that the boom in the Japanese economy had peaked out 
in April 1991.
An easy monetary policy continued toward mid-1992, when stock prices 
bottomed. During the period from late 1991 to mid-1992, the Bank of Japan cut the
official discount rate four times, from 5.5 percent to 3.25 percent, and market interest
rates declined, reflecting the cuts in the discount rate and the deceleration of the 
economic expansion. The uncollateralized overnight call rate dropped below 
5 percent in April 1992 and long-term interest rates declined accordingly. In the
meantime, the stock market dropped substantially, reflecting the downward revisions
of companies’ performances toward early April 1992. It suffered a further decline due
to increasing uncertainty about the future of the economy, and in August it fell below
¥15,000 for the first time in the post-“bubble” period. The Nikkei 225 showed a
slight recovery with the planning of the Emergency Economic Policy Package at 
end-August, moved around the ¥17,000 level in early 1993, and rose rapidly to above
¥20,000 in March, when an additional fiscal stimulus package was confirmed. 
Due to the prolonged recession, the easy monetary policy continued in 1993,
with the official discount rate cut to 2.5 percent in April and to 1.75 percent in
September. Short-term interest rates consistently declined, while long-term interest
rates temporarily rose in response to favorable economic indicators in the spring,
although they then declined sharply until the beginning of 1994 due to the yen’s
appreciation and weak prospects for the economy. Reflecting optimistic views on the
economy, stock prices rose in the spring of 1993, fell during October and November,
and recovered slightly thereafter. In the foreign exchange market, the yen rapidly
appreciated toward the summer of 1993.
In 1995, anxiety about deflation intensified. In the foreign exchange market, the
yen started to appreciate rapidly after February 1995, reflecting the disturbances such
as the Mexican Peso Crisis, and the appreciation accelerated to temporarily break 
the ¥80 level against the U.S. dollar in mid-April. The market’s forecast about the
future of the Japanese economy weakened, and the Nikkei 225 fell below ¥15,000 in
mid-June 1995. Under these circumstances, the Bank of Japan continued its easy
monetary policy by announcing at end-March that it would let the uncollateralized
overnight call rate decline, on average, to a level slightly below that of the official 
discount rate, and lowered the official discount rate from 1.75 percent to 1.0 percent
in April 1995. Subsequently, short-term interest rates further declined to a record-low
level reflecting a policy of additional easing in July (when the uncollateralized
overnight call rate was allowed to decline further) and September (when the official
discount rate was cut from 1.0 percent to 0.5 percent). Long-term interest rates also
remained at low levels. In the foreign exchange market, after July, policy coordination
among leading countries led the yen to modify its overshoot to around the ¥100 level
against the U.S. dollar. The Nikkei 225 also rebounded after July.
15
Extracting Market Expectations from Option Prices2. Movements of expectations in the stock market
Now we turn to the changes in market expectations during this period by observing the
changes in summary statistics about the implied probability distribution estimated
from option prices (Figure 8).
We can see that the standard deviation increased when stock prices dropped
sharply. This increase in standard deviation is notable in four phases: (1) from 
end-1989, when the Nikkei 225 reached its peak, to the fall of 1990, when it fell
below ¥20,000; (2) from mid-1991 to mid-1992, when the Nikkei 225 fell below
¥15,000 for the first time in the post-“bubble” period; (3) from the second half of
1993 to early 1994; and (4) from the beginning to the middle of 1995, when the yen
rapidly appreciated and anxiety about a possible deflationary spiral increased. In
addition, the level of the standard deviation increased after end-1989, which seems to
imply that market participants became more conscious of the risk of price volatility
after the stock market entered its adjustment phase.
The skewness shifted toward a negative value when stock prices were rising, and
toward a positive value when stock prices were falling. For example, when we look in
detail at the second half of 1989, there were three phases (the second half of July, the
second half of September, and from the second half of November to end-December)
in which the rise of the Nikkei 225 accelerated. The skewness shifted from slightly
positive to negative in all three cases. During the period around October 1991 when
stock prices tumbled, the skewness shifted back to a positive value. This relationship
between the market fluctuation and skewness is consistent with our hypothesis
shown in the previous chapter that the adjustment speed of participants’ confidence
on the future price will become asymmetric between the upper and lower directions
of the current market level according to the phases of market fluctuation. The 
excess kurtosis was negative on average, although the extent of negativity shrank or
sometimes turned positive under large price fluctuations and also showed a jump in
the case of an extreme price change. 
Table 3 calculates the coefficients of correlation between the daily changes 
of stock prices and the summary statistics for implied probability distributions. 
The table confirms the above observations on the movements of summary statistics
in accordance with fluctuations in market levels. The skewness showed a relatively
high negative correlation with the changes in stock prices. The standard deviation
and excess kurtosis indicated a positive correlation with the absolute value of daily
changes in stock prices.
Table 4 compares the summary statistics for implied probability distributions with
those for the distribution of daily changes in stock prices. Over the sample periods,
the mean was almost identical and the standard deviation showed a similar tendency,
while the skewness and excess kurtosis were quite different. The skewness was 
positive in many periods in the time-series data, while, except for 1992, it was 
negative in the implied probability distribution. The excess kurtosis was consistently
positive and formed a fat-tail distribution in the time-series data, while it was 
negative in the implied probability distribution.
In the following sections, we analyze the changes in financial market expectations
by examining the time series of the summary statistics of implied probability 
16 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/MAY 199917
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Figure 8  Stock Prices and Market Expectations (Overview)
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1989 90 91 92 93 94 95 96distributions for the following three periods: (1) the second half of 1989 to the first
half of 1991, the period of the collapse of the “bubble” in the stock market; (2) 1992
to the beginning of 1994, the period of serious stock market slump; and (3) 1995,
the period of increasing anxiety in the market about a possible deflationary spiral. 
B. During the Collapse of the “Bubble”
First, with respect to the period of the collapsing “bubble,” we examine the three
periods that show striking movement from the viewpoint of stock price and interest
rate fluctuation as well as monetary policy operation: (1) from the introduction 
of the Nikkei 225 options to December 29, 1989, when stock prices peaked; 
(2) from the peak of stock prices to April 1990, when stock prices tumbled 
below ¥30,000; and (3) from June to October 1990, when the Nikkei 225 rapidly
fell after a short rebound to a level temporarily below ¥20,000. The points at issue
here will be how strongly confidence changed and how monetary policy responses
affected such changes.
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Table 4  Comparison of Summary Statistics: Distribution of Daily Changes and
Implied Probability Distribution
Daily changes Implied probability distribution
Mean Stdv Skew Ex-Kurt Mean Stdv Skew Ex-Kurt
Full sample –5.663 23.197 0.443 5.348 –5.753 16.411 –0.274 –0.603
1989 31.377 8.321 –0.346 1.323 31.206 6.285 –0.452 –0.866
1990 –39.233 32.447 0.829 5.751 –38.632 15.359 –0.151 –1.140
1991 –3.700 21.066 –0.065 2.508 –2.386 13.311 –0.352 –1.046
1992 –25.286 29.785 0.436 1.064 –25.185 23.188 0.051 –0.569
1993 2.956 20.505 0.252 1.813 3.234 17.362 –0.203 –0.362
1994 13.406 17.753 0.867 8.910 10.410 16.227 –0.345 –0.453
1995 0.739 22.503 0.122 2.304 0.348 19.230 –0.362 –0.126
1996 28.048 14.657 0.698 2.897 29.271 14.918 –0.713 –0.073
Notes: 1. Mean (daily changes) and standard deviation are annualized.
2. The sample period for 1989 is the second half of the year and that for 1996 is the first half of
the year.
Table 3  Correlation between Market Level Changes and Summary Fluctuations
Mean Stdv Skew Ex-Kurt
Full sample 0.775 0.227 –0.347 0.081
1989 0.544 0.102 –0.408 0.113
1990 0.663 0.113 –0.532 0.160
1991 0.725 0.008 –0.435 0.146
1992 0.801 0.143 –0.347 0.182
1993 0.849 0.078 –0.350 0.301
1994 0.871 0.406 –0.234 0.167
1995 0.894 0.072 –0.309 0.011
1996 0.813 –0.126 –0.297 0.017
Notes: 1. Figures in the table are the coefficients of correlation between daily changes of the Nikkei
225 (closing price) and summary statistics. With respect to standard deviation and excess
kurtosis, we take absolute values for the daily changes of the Nikkei 225.
2. The sample period for 1989 is the second half of the year and that for 1996 is the first half of
the year.1. Prior to the peak of the Nikkei 225 (June–December 1989)
First, we will take up the period ranging from the introduction of the Nikkei 225
options to December 29, 1989, a day when stock prices peaked.
Figure 9 shows the changes in stock price expectations during this period. As
mentioned, in the second half of 1989 toward the peak of the Nikkei 225, there were
three phases (the second half of July, the second half of September, and from the 
second half of November to end-December) in which the rising pace of the Nikkei
225 accelerated. In each period, the skewness declined from around zero to a negative
value, the standard deviation remained almost constant, and the excess kurtosis
moved up and down substantially when stock prices soared.
When we examine these periods with reference to monetary policy up to the 
rise in the official discount rate from 3.25 percent to 3.75 percent on October 11,
the standard deviation and skewness both increased, and the excess kurtosis also
increased while showing volatile ups and downs. From such changes in the shape 
of the distribution, we conjecture that, while the forecast for the official discount 
rate rise prevailed, the risk of stock price changes also intensified. Therefore, a view
that the rise in the official discount rate was already incorporated in the market 
sentiment at that time is not consistent with the movement of the estimated 
implied probability distribution.
If we focus on the movement of the standard deviation, we can see that there 
was a large jump at the time of shifts in the most actively traded contract months
after July 1989. In particular, at the time of shift from the October contract to 
the November contract in 1989 (shown in Figure 9 as a vertical dashed line), not
only was the magnitude of the jump large but the shift itself was delayed until 
immediately before the exercise date. This movement in the standard deviation can
be interpreted as indicating that while the forecast for the official discount rate rise
prevailed, the risk of short-term stock price changes became large, and thus resulted
in a delay in the shift of the most actively traded contract months and a jump in 
the standard deviation.
19
During the rise of the Nikkei 225 to its peak, from mid-November to end-
December, the skewness initially declined, although it started to increase in 
mid-December, reducing the extent of negativity. The standard deviation gradually
declined, while the excess kurtosis showed an increasing trend with up and down
movements. Such changes in expectation distribution can be interpreted to imply
that confidence in future stock price rises intensified, reflecting the rise in the stock
market. This rise in the stock market was longer in duration and larger in magnitude
than the other two phases. The potential risk of a stock price fall might have 
been increasing during this period, although recognition of such risk seems to have 
diminished in accordance with the actual rise in the stock market.
20
19
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19. With respect to the interpretation of the large jumps in the standard deviation at the time of shifts in the most
actively traded contract months, it should be noted that the accuracy of the estimation results was not necessarily
high when the expiration date of the option approached. 
20. Some commentators have pointed out that massive quantities of mutual funds subscribed to by individual
investors were set up during this period.20 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/MAY 1999
Figure 9  Market Expectations of the Nikkei 225 (from July 1989 to January 1990)
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Note: Each vertical line with a circle at the top shows the date when the official discount rate was
changed (October 11, 1989: 3.25 percent ® 3.75 percent; December 25, 1989: 3.75 percent 
® 4.25 percent), and each vertical dashed line with a diamond at the top shows the date when
the most actively traded contract months were changed.Finally, during the period from the beginning of 1990, when stock prices peaked
and started to fall, the skewness and standard deviation increased substantially,
implying that market participants became more cautious regarding the downside risk
of the stock market. In fact, it was reported that uncertainty in the market spread
rapidly after the rise in the official discount rate. 
2. After the peak of the Nikkei 225 (December 1989–May 1990)
Next, we consider the period from December 1989 to May 1990, when stock prices
peaked and fell sharply to below ¥30,000 (Figure 10). During this period, the Nikkei
225 fell by some ¥10,000, and there were roughly five declining phases. 
The skewness, in general, was slightly positive from mid-February, reflecting the
declining trend of the market, while showing an increase when stock prices fell. The
standard deviation gradually increased, and excess kurtosis exhibited a volatile move-
ment, jumping in a positive direction when stock prices declined. Such a movement
in the summary statistics is consistent with the typical patterns summarized in the
previous section.
21
However, what was notable in this period was the large fluctuation and long
adjustment period of the skewness when the market level fell. During this period,
once stock prices fell, the increase in the skewness was quite large, and, even after
stock prices regained their stability, it took a long time until the increased skewness
returned to the level prior to the stock price fall. Such movements of the skewness
imply the possibility that, even after stock prices entered the declining phase, bullish
sentiment in the market did not retreat, and thus resulted in the delayed adjustment
of market expectations during the price fall.
22
Figure 11 shows graphically how market expectations developed during this
period. Two cases are assumed in which the market fell as time elapsed from 0 to 1,
and further to 2. It seems that, even after stock prices began to fall, market partici-
pants’ bullish sentiments did not easily diminish. This made the implied probability
distribution more skewed to the right compared with the case of other stock price
falls, resulting in more time required for a resumption of the symmetric shape.
According to press reports, market participants began to expect a rebound of
stock prices in late April. In addition to their underlying sentiment that the stock
price would bottom out at ¥28,000, they welcomed the effects of the yen’s apprecia-
tion, because it would restrain inflation fears and thus contain the rise in interest
rates. Indeed, when we look at the probability distribution, rises in the standard devi-
ation and excess kurtosis seem to have come to a halt, and market expectations might
have been focused on a regaining of stability. 
3. Further tightening: the Nikkei 225 falls below ¥20,000 (July–November 1990)
The third period we consider is that from July to November 1990. Although 
the Nikkei 225 showed a slight recovery in May, it fell sharply again after July, and
21
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21. Monetary policy was further tightened on March 20 through a rise in the official discount rate from 4.25 percent
to 5.25 percent, although it did not affect the overall development of expectations since such tightening seemed
to have already been incorporated in market expectations.
22. Some people hold the view that, during this period, economic conditions were adversely affected by the progres-
sive depreciation of the yen and the rise in U.S. interest rates, and thus confused the market’s sense of direction.
In the course of the market’s seeking a bottom, cautiousness about future prospects might have intensified.22 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/MAY 1999
Figure 10  Market Expectations of the Nikkei 225 (from December 1989 to May 1990)
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Note: Each vertical line with a circle at the top shows the date when the official discount rate was
changed (December 25, 1989: 3.75 percent ® 4.25 percent; March 20, 1990: 4.25 percent 
® 5.25 percent), and each vertical dashed line with a diamond at the top shows the date when
the most actively traded contract months were changed.23
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temporarily fell below ¥20,000 in October.
23 When we look at the development 
of stock price expectations during this period (Figure 12), the standard deviation 
generally rose, and the skewness rose when stock prices fell.
Particularly interesting is the large jump in standard deviation before and after the shift
of the most actively traded contract month during the period from July to
September. Specifically, the shift from September options to October options was
delayed until September 11, three days before the exercise date, and the jump in standard
deviation was quite large. On August 30, owing to the boost in oil prices caused by the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the official discount rate was raised for the fifth time during the
“bubble” era, from 5.25 percent to 6.0 percent, and there seems to have been increasing
uncertainty in the market about the future even one month ahead. 
Prior to a sharp drop in stock prices from end-September to early October, the
skewness rapidly increased from mid- to late September while stock prices declined
moderately. This implies the possibility that there had been a delay in adjusting stock
price expectations downward, and it is possible to interpret this to mean that, as a
result of bullish sentiment having been largely revised, stock prices fell sharply from
end-September to early October.
Let’s examine how expectations derived from the 10-year JGB futures option
developed during the same period (Figure 13). The standard deviation increased
toward end-August, when the official discount rate was raised, although it showed a large
drop when the most actively traded contract month shifted. This implies that the
timing of the official discount rate rise was approaching, and the risk of price fluctuations
in the immediate future was quite large. In addition, when declining bond prices
bounced back from end-September (because of the decline in interest rates), the standard













at t = 2
Mean of distribution
at t = 0
Mean of distribution 
at t = 1
t = 1 t = 0
Delays in market 
expectation 
adjustment
Figure 11  Market Expectations after Reaching the Historically Highest Price in the
Stock Markets
Probability density
23. During this period, the Nikkei 225 (closing price) hit bottom at ¥20,221.86 on October 1, although it momen-
tarily fell below ¥20,000 and recorded ¥19,781.70 during the trading day.24 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/MAY 1999
Figure 12  Market Expectations of the Nikkei 225 (from July to November 1990)
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Note: Each vertical line with a circle at the top shows the date when the official discount rate 
was changed (August 30, 1990: 5.25 percent ® 6.0 percent), and each vertical dashed line 
with a diamond at the top shows the date when the most actively traded contract months 
were changed.
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Note: Each vertical line with a circle at the top shows the date when the official discount rate 
was changed (August 30, 1990: 5.25 percent ® 6.0 percent), and each vertical dashed line 
with a diamond at the top shows the date when the most actively traded contract months 
were changed.Subsequently, the standard deviation declined after the beginning of November. In the
meantime, the skewness moved in an opposite direction in accordance with the rise 
and fall of bond futures prices.
C. The Period of Serious Stock Market Slump
Next, we will examine the period of serious stock market slump, from 1992 to the
beginning of 1994, by dividing the period into two parts: (1) from March to October
1992, which includes the point in time when the Nikkei 225 fell below ¥15,000 for
the first time after the collapse of the asset price bubble; and (2) from October 1993
to March 1994, when stock prices collapsed again.
1. The fall of the Nikkei 225 below ¥15,000 for the first time after the collapse
of the asset price bubble (March–October 1992)
First, we examine the movement of market expectations before and after August 18,
1992, the day on which the Nikkei 225 fell below ¥15,000 for the first time since the
asset price bubble collapsed. Figure 14 shows a time series of summary statistics of
implied probability distributions. 
The standard deviation was on an increasing trend from mid-1991 and had
reached a rather high level by March 1992 (see Figure 8). It further increased when
stock prices tumbled (from late March to early April, in mid-June, and in August),
showing that market participants had become increasingly cautious concerning the
risk of price changes. Skewness moved in the opposite direction to stock price
changes, and, on average, increased its level from mid-June to August, implying that
downward adjustment of stock prices expectations was delayed. Excess kurtosis
showed large fluctuations, which suggests the emergence of large disturbances in the
stock market. In particular, from the large fluctuations in late March to early April
(when stock prices were falling), and in September (which saw a strong rebound after
the bottoming out in August), we can observe that expectations became volatile 
during these periods.
24
In the JGB futures market (Figure 15), prices rose (yields fell) from mid-June, and
expectations of a fall in interest rates increased in the market. Prior to the cut in the
official discount rate in July, the standard deviation declined slightly, while the excess
kurtosis, although volatile, increased to around zero. This movement implies that
confidence in the level of long-term interest rates intensified at that time, and that
the market had already incorporated a cut in the official discount rate. 
2. Another fall in stock prices (October 1993–March 1994)
Next, we analyze the period from October 1993 to March 1994, when stock prices
fell again. Figure 16 shows the changes in stock price expectations.
During the period from late October to early December, when stock prices 
tumbled, the standard deviation increased and the excess kurtosis rose with large
swings, suggesting the increased risk of stock price fluctuations. Skewness also
increased, implying that there was a delay in adjusting expectations to the decline 
in market level.
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24. In addition, a jump of standard deviation at the time of contract shift during the stock price bottom can also be
interpreted to show the increase in uncertainty about future stock prices.27
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Figure 14  Market Expectations of the Nikkei 225 (from March to October 1992)
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Note: Each vertical line with a circle at the top shows the date when the official discount rate was
changed (April 1, 1992: 4.5 percent ® 3.75 percent; July 27, 1992: 3.75 percent ® 3.25 percent),
and each vertical dashed line with a diamond at the top shows the date when the most actively
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Note: Each vertical line with a circle at the top shows the date when the official discount rate was
changed (April 1, 1992: 4.5 percent ® 3.75 percent; July 27, 1992: 3.75 percent ® 3.25 percent),
and each vertical dashed line with a diamond at the top shows the date when the most actively
traded contract months were changed.
Daily changes (left scale)
Futures prices (right scale)29
Extracting Market Expectations from Option Prices
Note: Each vertical line with a circle at the top shows the date when the official discount rate was
changed (September 21, 1993: 2.5 percent ® 1.75 percent), and each vertical dashed line with a
diamond at the top shows the date when the most actively traded contract months were changed.
Figure 16  Market Expectations of the Nikkei 225 (from September 1993 to March 1994)
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–2In January 1994, stock prices recovered, although the standard deviation also rose
rapidly, suggesting an increase in price fluctuation risk. In addition, since there was a
large jump in the standard deviation at the time of changes in the most actively
traded contract months, uncertainty concerning the sustainability of the stock price
recovery seems to have been strong. In fact, when price recovery came to a halt in
February, the standard deviation increased sharply and the excess kurtosis became
highly volatile, suggesting that the anxiety about the stock price fall had spread in 
the stock market.
Developments in the JGB futures market are shown in Figure 17. Between late
November 1993 and early February 1994, when bond prices rose and yields fell, the
skewness remained negative while moving up and down according to changes in
bond prices. This implies that downward risk of bond prices was large and confi-
dence in price rises was not necessarily strong. Moreover, the standard deviation
showed a distinctive movement, substantially increasing in January 1994 and falling
rapidly in February. At this time, in addition to diminishing expectations of an early
cut in the official discount rate due to the recovery in the stock prices, the concern
that an extra issue of government bonds and the resumption of bond sales by the
government might worsen supply and demand conditions in the market seems to
have led to increased expectations of a falling market. 
D. Anxiety about a Possible Deflationary Spiral
Finally, we will consider the period from December 1994 to September 1995, 
when the yen appreciated rapidly and anxiety about a possible deflationary spiral
intensified. Specifically, we examine the relationship between market expectations
and monetary policy operations for the sub-periods of (1) December 1994 to May
1995, when the yen appreciated rapidly; and (2) April to September 1995, when the
Nikkei 225 temporarily fell below ¥15,000.
1. Rapid appreciation of the yen (December 1994–May 1995)
First we focus on the period from December 1994 to May 1995. During this period,
the yen gradually appreciated from January onward, then accelerated rapidly after
March to break the ¥80 level against the U.S. dollar. The stock market was in 
a declining trend from January onward, and after undergoing alternate phases of 
sudden and gradual declines, the Nikkei 225 fell close to ¥15,000 early in April.
Figure 18 shows changes in stock price expectations during this phase. During the
first decline in late January 1995, immediately after the Great Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake,
25 all three summary statistics (the standard deviation, skewness, and
excess kurtosis) substantially increased. Subsequently, however, the skewness dropped
back to the level prior to the increase in accordance with changes in the most actively
traded contract months, and the increase of the skewness and excess kurtosis 
disappeared in a relatively short period of time. Therefore, the impact of the stock
price fall seems to have been smoothly absorbed by the market as a temporary shock.
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25. The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake was the worst natural disaster in 70 years in Japan. More than 5,000 
people died, and an additional two million people, including foreign residents, were significantly affected.31
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Note: Each vertical line with a circle at the top shows the date when the official discount rate was
changed (September 21, 1993: 2.5 percent ® 1.75 percent), and each vertical dashed line with a
diamond at the top shows the date when the most actively traded contract months were changed.32 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/MAY 1999
Figure 18  Market Expectations of the Nikkei 225 (from December 1994 to May 1995)
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Note: Each vertical line with a circle at the top shows the date when the official discount rate was
changed (April 14, 1995: 1.75 percent ® 1.0 percent), and each vertical dashed line with a
diamond at the top shows the date when the most actively traded contract months were changed.
Daily changes (left scale)
Stock price level (right scale)In contrast, during the stock price fall from late February to early April, the 
skewness, while showing volatile movement opposite to the changes in the stock
prices, remained consistently positive. The standard deviation increased, and the
excess kurtosis exhibited volatile movements. Such movements in the summary 
statistics imply that downward adjustments of stock price expectations lagged behind,
while the risk of a price fall was increasing.
In the meantime, from late February onward, long-term interest rates declined
and bond prices increased. When we look at the expectation distribution of the 
JGB futures prices (Figure 19), the standard deviation increased substantially from
mid-February to mid-April, while the skewness gradually declined in accordance with
the rise in bond prices. These movements suggest that, from late February onward,
market participants started to incorporate expectations of a cut in the official 
discount rate, which occurred in April.
2. The fall of the Nikkei 225 below ¥15,000 (April–September 1995)
Next, we take up the period from April to September 1995, when the Nikkei 225 fell
below ¥15,000. During this period, the yen slowed its pace of appreciation and
turned to depreciation from July onward, and the Nikkei 225 fell below ¥15,000
twice (in mid-June and from end-June to the beginning of July).
The changes in market expectations during this phase of falling stock prices
(Figure 20) were that the skewness increased along with the price fall in mid-June
and maintained this increased level, while the standard deviation rose. The excess
kurtosis exhibited unstable movements, although its swing remained small. These
movements in the summary statistics suggest that there was a delayed adjustment 
to the fall in stock prices, and due to the differing prospects about the effects of the
economic stimulus package, market expectations seem to have diversified. 
In addition, the summary statistics exhibited irregular movements from mid-July
to September. Unique to this period were the large positive value of the excess 
kurtosis and the large jump in the standard deviation when the most actively traded
contract months changed. Such changes imply that, even in the course of stock price
recovery after July, market participants remained well aware of a downside risk 
in stock prices. 
While a consensus prevailed concerning the economic slowdown that occurred
from May to July, the JGB futures prices rose and, from mid-July onward, they
turned down, then rose again from mid-August onward. The probability distribution
of the JGB futures prices (Figure 21) tells us that, around the turning point of the
market in early July, the standard deviation increased and the excess kurtosis also
increased with some volatility, which implies that there was a perceived increase in
the risk of large price fluctuations. In addition, from mid-August to early September,
when the official discount rate was raised, the standard deviation rose, which implies
that market participants were gradually absorbing the forthcoming rate raise.
However, there was a large jump in the standard deviation in mid-August, when the
most actively traded contract months changed, which suggests that there might have
been a large shift in market views around this time.
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Note: Each vertical line with a circle at the top shows the date when the official discount rate was
changed (April 14, 1995: 1.75 percent ® 1.0 percent), and each vertical dashed line with a
diamond at the top shows the date when the most actively traded contract months were changed.35
Extracting Market Expectations from Option Prices
Figure 20  Market Expectations of the Nikkei 225 (from April to September 1995)
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Note: Each vertical line with a circle at the top shows the date when the official discount rate was
changed (September 8, 1995: 1.0 percent ® 0.5 percent), and each vertical dashed line with a
diamond at the top shows the date when the most actively traded contract months were changed.
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Note: Each vertical line with a circle at the top shows the date when the official discount rate was
changed (September 8, 1995: 1.0 percent ® 0.5 percent), and each vertical dashed line with a
diamond at the top shows the date when the most actively traded contract months were changed.IV. Conclusion
In this paper, we have estimated the time series of implied probability distributions
for the periods of the collapsing “bubble” (1989–90), serious stock market slump
(1992–94), and increasing anxiety about a deflationary spiral (1995). Based on these
estimates, we considered (1) how market expectations of future stock prices and 
long-term interest rates changed; (2) how and when the relationships between such
market expectations and economic indicators changed; and (3) how monetary policy
implementation affected such market expectations.
In summary, market participants’ expectations are too diverse and informative to be
captured merely by using a single summary statistic, i.e., the mean, because the same
mean value implies different market expectations and policy implications, depending
on the shape of probability distribution of expected outcome. In particular, since
market participants’ confidence in stock prices differs substantially depending on
timing, we can expect to capture more market information, both qualitatively and
quantitatively, by carefully examining the changes in market participants’ expecta-
tions that lie behind stock price fluctuations. The results presented in this paper suggest
that the implied probability distribution extracted from option prices will provide
useful information for the conduct of monetary policy operations. 
This paper found typical patterns linking large fluctuations of asset prices and the
changes in the shape of implied probability distribution extracted from option prices
by tracking the time-series movements of summary statistics. It also considered how
to interpret such time-series movements in probability distribution as changes in
market expectations, and discussed possible policy implications. However, studies on
how to make use of the information extracted from option prices in policy judgments
have only just begun.
26 For example, we have dealt with the effects of asset price 
fluctuations on market expectations, while issues such as the effects of specific 
patterns of changes in probability distribution on market fluctuations will be worth
examining for analyses of market liquidity and stress situations. 
In addition, as Woodford (1994) and Bernanke and Woodford (1997) pointed
out in considering the role of asset prices in monetary policy operations, if a central
bank tries to conduct monetary policy based on a certain feedback rule concerning
asset prices, bilateral causality will emerge between asset prices and market 
participants’ expectations concerning future monetary policy, and thus may lead to a
destabilization of the economy.
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26. Methods of extracting expectations concerning future asset prices from option price information have already
been put in practice by many central banks around the world. Implied forward rates are used in most G-7 
countries. However, as regards the utilization of option price information, many countries, at most, evaluate the
dispersion of expectations concerning future asset prices by using implied volatility estimated by the Black-
Scholes formula. Countries that actively utilize risk-neutral implied probability distributions in monetary policy
judgment are still quite limited in number.APPENDIX 1: METHODOLOGY FOR ESTIMATING IMPLIED
PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS
In this appendix, we examine two types of estimation methods for implied proba-
bility distributions: one method is to estimate a probability density function, and the
other is to estimate a cumulative distribution function. In this paper, we apply the
latter estimation method. 
A. Estimation of Probability Density Functions
First, we explain the method for estimating a probability density function directly.
Supposing a risk-neutral market player, the price of a European-type call option (C )
is given by
C = exp[–r(T – t)]E[max(0, FT –K )]
+¥ (A.1)
= exp[–r(T – t)]∫w(FT)max(0, FT –K )dFT,
–¥
where FT, K, w(FT), and r denote the price of an underlying asset on the expiration
date (t =T ) of the option, the strike price of the option, a risk-free interest rate, and a
probability density function for the value FT, respectively.
In option trading, an investor is required to maintain funds in a margin account when
he or she writes an option. This is because the investor’s broker and the exchange
want to be satisfied that the investor will not default if the option is exercised.
Although the size of the required margin depends on circumstances, the margin 
calculation is repeated every day. When the calculation indicates that a significantly 
greater margin is required, a margin call will be made. Thus, the pricing formula for 
a call option (A.1) can be simplified as follows: 
+¥
C = ∫w(FT)max(0, FT – K )dFT. (A.2)
–¥
In addition, if we let CK and CKK be the first and second derivatives of the call
option price, then the call option price satisfies the following conditions: 
+¥
CK = –∫w(FT)dFT, (A.3)
K
CKK = w(K ). (A.4)
Similarly, if we let P, P K, andCKK be the European-type put option price, and the
first and second derivatives of the put option price, then we have
+¥
P = ∫w(FT)max(0, K – FT)dFT, (A.5)
–¥
K
PK = ∫w(FT)dFT, (A.6)
–¥
PKK = w(K ). (A.7)
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finite number of strike prices. This implies that equations (A.3), (A.4), (A.6), and
(A.7) do not hold strictly in the observed market prices, because they assume that the
variable C is continuous in K. Thus we apply the second-order finite difference
method, as Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) proposed, to equation (A.4), and obtain
w(Ki), the probability density function of the strike price Ki as follows:
Ci –1 – 2Ci + Ci +1
w(Ki) ≈ . (A.8) (Ki +1 – Ki –1)
2
If we let p(K*) be the probability density over [Ki – 0.5k, Ki + 0.5k], where k is
some positive value, then we have 
p(Ki*) ≈w(Ki)·k, (A.9)
which yields
Ci –1 – 2Ci + Ci +1 p(Ki*) ≈ , (A.10)
Ki +1 – Ki –1
where k = Ki +1 – Ki(i = 1, 2, 3, . . .). This implies that we can estimate the probability
density for a strike price from three call option prices. 
Similarly, in the case of a put option, by applying the second-order finite differ-
ence method to equation (A.7), we have
Pi +1 – 2Pi + Pi –1 p(Ki*) ≈ . (A.11)
Ki +1 – Ki –1
However, this approach has a disadvantage: if the range of observable strike prices
is not wide, the sum of the probabilities will be smaller than unity. Moreover, it 
cannot distinguish how much of the missing probability is attributable to the upper
or lower edge of the probability distribution. This suggests the impossibility of 
estimating the skewness of the distribution of expected asset price changes. 
B. Estimation of Cumulative Distribution Functions
Next, we examine the other approach, which estimates not the probability density
function but rather the cumulative distribution function or implied probability 
distribution from the option prices (Neuhaus [1995]). This approach focuses on the 
information content of call (put) option premiums that contain payoff probabilities 
above (below) the respective strike price. In this case, the relative frequency is calculated
as the difference of the cumulative probabilities for the two adjacent strike prices.
In the call option, from equation (A.3), we have 
+¥
CK = –∫w(FT)dFT = –p(FT ³ K ). (A.12)
K
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contains information on the cumulative distribution function. By applying the 
first-order finite difference method, we obtain 
Ci –1 – Ci +1 p(FT ³ Ki) ≈ , (A.13)
Ki +1 – Ki –1
yielding the probability as 
Ci –1 – Ci +1       Ci – Ci +2 p(Ki) = p(FT ³ Ki) – p(FT ³ Ki+1) ≈ –               . (A.14)
Ki +1 – Ki –1       Ki +2 – Ki
Analogously, from equation (A.6), we have the probability from the put option
prices as
Pi +2 – Pi Pi +1 – Pi –1 p(Ki) = p(FT ≤ Ki +1) – p(FT ≤ Ki) ≈ –                 . (A.15)
Ki +2 – Ki Ki +1 – Ki –1
Here, we estimate the probability for the class between two adjacent strike prices,
although Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) calculate the probability density over the
constant interval around the respective strike price Ki*.
With this estimation method, we can derive the upper part of a probability 
distribution above the lowest strike price of a call option, and the lower part of a
probability distribution below the highest strike price of a put option. Thus, we can
eliminate the missing probability and obtain the complete probability distribution by
combining these two probability distributions. Since the objective of this paper is to
estimate the implied probability distribution to examine the development of market
expectations, we employ not the method of Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) but
that of Neuhaus (1995). 
It is often pointed out that ITM options tend to be priced incorrectly. Therefore,
we employ the following strategy to estimate a complete probability distribution: 
we first calculate two probability distributions from the option premium for 
OTM call and put options separately, then combine these probability distributions 
to the complete probability distribution.
27 In other words, we use the probability 
distribution derived from OTM put options in the lower range from the ATM strike
price, and that derived from OTM call options in the upper range.
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27. Needless to say, even though they are OTM options, deep-OTM options tend to be priced incorrectly.
Therefore, we excluded the observation in estimating the complete probability distribution, if the calculated 
relative frequency turned negative.APPENDIX 2: BASIC FRAMEWORK OF OPTION TRADING 
IN JAPAN
In this appendix, we summarize the basic trading framework of the Nikkei 225
option and the JGB futures option (see the Appendix Table for an outline of each
transaction).
The Nikkei 225 option (a European-type option) began trading in June 1989.
The contract months are four consecutive near-term expiration months, and five
strike prices are set ¥1,000 and ¥500 above and below the strike price closest to the
central price, which is initially set as the closing price of the Nikkei 225 on the 
business day before the first day of trading. The last trading day is the business day
before the second Friday of each expiration month, and the option can be exercised
on the business day following the last trading day.
The JGB futures option (an American-type option) began trading in May 1990.
The contract months are the two closest months to March, June, September, and
41
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Sources: For the Nikkei 225 options, Osaka Securities Exchange (http://www.ose.or.jp); for options on




Nikkei 225 stock price index
Nikkei 225 multiplied by ¥1,000
Four consecutive near-term expiration
months
The business day before the second Friday
of each expiration month
Four months
Five strike prices are initially opened with
¥500 intervals, i.e., 2 OTMs, 1 ATM, and 
2 ITMs. Additional strike prices will be
available according to the movement of the
underlying Nikkei 225 Stock Average.
European-type option (the business day
following the last trading day)
¥5 in the case of premiums at or below
¥1,000, and ¥10 in the case of premiums
above ¥1,000
±¥1,000 (previous day’s closing price of
Nikkei 225 is less than 20,000); ±¥1,500
(20,000–less than 30,000); ±¥2,000






JGB futures of ¥100 million in face value
Two months closest to March, June,
September, and December (quarterly
months) plus one or two serial months
(non-quarterly months: since November
20, 1997)
The last business day of the month prior 
to the delivery month of the underlying
JGB futures
Six months
Seven strike prices are initially opened 
with ¥1 intervals, i.e., 3 OTMs, 1 ATM, 
and 3 ITMs. Additional strike prices will be
available according to the underlying JGB
futures’ price movement.
American-type option (a buyer of an option
may exercise the option at any time prior
to expiration). All in-the-money options 
at the end of the expiration date will be
automatically exercised, unless otherwise
instructed.
1/100 points per 100 points (¥10,000 per
contract)
Two points upward or downward 
(¥2 million per contract)December,
28 and seven strike prices are set with three ¥1 intervals above and below
the central price, which is set based on the closing price of the previous business day.
The last trading day is the last business day of the month prior to the delivery month
of the underlying JGB futures, and the option can be exercised at any time during
the six-month trading period. 
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28. It should be noted that, in addition to the four contract months mentioned above, short-term option trading that
starts from the 20th of the month prior to the last trading month has taken place since November 20, 1997.43
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